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Abstract
The communist norm requires that scientists widely share the results of
their work. Where did this norm come from, and how does it persist? I argue on
the basis of a game-theoretic model that rational credit-maximizing scientists
will in many cases conform to the norm. This means that the origins and
persistence of the communist norm can be explained even in the absence of a
social contract or enforcement, contrary to recent work by Michael Strevens
but adding to previous work emphasizing the benefits of the incentive structure
created by the priority rule.
1 Introduction
The social value of scientific work is highest when it is widely shared. Work that is
shared can be built upon by other scientists, and utilized in the wider society. Work
that is not shared can only be built upon or utilized by the original discoverer, and
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would have to be duplicated by others before they can use it, leading to inefficient
double work.1
To put the point more strongly, work that is not widely shared is not really
scientific work. Insofar as science is essentially a social enterprise, representing
the cumulative stock of human knowledge, work that other scientists do not know
about and cannot build upon is not science (cf. the distinction between Science and
Technology in Dasgupta and David 1994). The sharing of scientific work is thus a
necessary condition not merely for the success of science, but in an important sense
for its very existence.
The sociologist Robert Merton first noticed that there exists an institutional norm
in science that mandates widely sharing. He called this the communist norm, according
to which “[t]he substantive findings of science. . . are assigned to the community. . . The
scientist’s claim to ‘his’ intellectual ‘property’ is limited to that of recognition and
esteem” (Merton 1942, 121). Subsequent empirical work by Louis et al. (2002) and
Macfarlane and Cheng (2008) confirms that over 90% of scientists recognize this
norm of sharing. Moreover, most scientists (if not as many as 90%) consistently
conform to the communist norm.
The existence of this norm raises two questions. Where did it come from? And
how does it persist? In light of what I said above, these are important questions.
A good understanding of what makes the communist norm persist tells us which
aspects of the institutional structure of science can be changed without affecting the
communist norm. Understanding its origins might allow us to reinstate the communist
norm if it disappeared for whatever reason. Insofar as we value the existence and
success of science, these are things we should want to know.
Strevens (2017) gives what he calls a “Hobbesian vindication” of the communist
norm by showing that scientists should be willing to sign a contract that enforces
sharing. The claim is that, from a credit-maximizing perspective, it is not rational
for an individual scientist to share her work (which would help other scientists more
than her), but every scientist is better off if everyone shares than if no one shares.
In contrast, I argue that in many circumstances sharing is rational from a credit-
maximizing perspective for an individual scientist. If my argument is successful, it
provides a more detailed account of the origins and the persistence of the communist
norm than Strevens’s Hobbesian vindication. It also adds to a tradition of work in
philosophy and economics that has emphasized how individual scientists’ “selfish”
desire to receive credit for their work furthers the aims of science (e.g., Kitcher 1990,
1Of course scientific work is often duplicated by others even when it is shared (so-called repli-
cations). But this is not inefficient in the same way, as after the replication is shared the work is
known by all to be more certainly established than if only one or the other instance was shared.
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Dasgupta and David 1994, Strevens 2003).
Because the existence of a norm can itself change what is in scientists’ interests
to do, the sense of “rational” in the above needs to be clarified. For this purpose, I
rely on the terminology for social norms developed by Bicchieri (2006). I explain this
terminology in section 2 and use it to state Strevens’s position more precisely.
Section 3 sets out my own position by explaining how the idea that scientists
can publish and claim credit for intermediate results can be used to establish the
rationality of sharing. Sections 4 and 5 make this more precise by describing a game-
theoretic model of scientists needing to decide whether to share their intermediate
results, and establishing conditions under which rational credit-maximizing scientists
should be expected to share.2
Section 6 fleshes out my explanation of the persistence of the communist norm
and considers some objections. I extend my explanation to include the origins of the
norm in section 7, which involves considering boundedly rational scientists and some
historical evidence. A brief conclusion wraps up the article.
2 Social Norms and Communism
The question that this article focuses on is whether it is in a scientist’s interest to
behave in accordance with the communist norm. More specifically, would it be in
scientists’ interest to share their work even in the absence of a norm telling them to
do so? To clarify the question, I use some terminology defined by Bicchieri (2006).
She defines a social norm as follows:
Let R be a behavioral rule for situations of type S, where S can be
represented as a mixed-motive game. We say that R is a social norm in a
population P if there exists a sufficiently large subset Pcf ⊆ P such that,
for each individual i ∈ Pcf:
Contingency: i knows that a rule R exists and applies to situations of
type S;
Conditional preference: i prefers to conform to R in situations of type S
on the condition that:
(a) Empirical expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P
conforms to R in situations of type S;
2The idea of using game theory to get a better understanding of norms in science goes back at
least to Bicchieri (1988).
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and either
(b) Normative expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P
expects i to conform to R in situations of type S;
or
(b′) Normative expectations with sanctions: i believes that a sufficiently
large subset of P expects i to conform to R in situations of type S, prefers
i to conform, and may sanction behavior. (Bicchieri 2006, 11)
The crucial feature of this definition is the requirement of normative expectations.
This says that an individual’s preference to conform to the norm is conditional on
others’ expectations (possibly enforced by sanctions). For example, norms surrounding
the sharing of food are plausibly social norms: in the absence of others expecting
them to share, many people might prefer not to share even if they knew most other
people shared. In contrast, if an individual knows that in a particular country most
people drive on the right side of the road, she would probably prefer to do the same
even if others had no expectations about her behavior.
The language of game theory is useful to sharpen these ideas. Recall that
conforming to a behavioral rule R constitutes a (Nash) equilibrium if no individual
has an incentive to deviate unilaterally; that is, everyone prefers to conform given
that everyone else does.
If knowledge of R and empirical expectations (that others will conform to R) are
sufficient to make an individual prefer to conform to R, then R is an equilibrium of the
underlying game S. But if normative expectations are required, that is, if individuals
only prefer to conform to R if others expect them to conform (and, possibly, are
willing to back this up with sanctions), then R is not an equilibrium of the “original”
game: it is only made into an equilibrium by the existence of the norm itself. So
the existence of a social norm transforms the underlying game by changing people’s
preferences, thus creating a new equilibrium (Bicchieri 2006, 25–27).
Is the communist norm a social norm in this sense; that is, are normative ex-
pectations a necessary ingredient to make it in scientists’ interest to share their
work? In order to answer this question, an account of scientists’ interests is needed
that is independent of the communist norm, so that the question can be asked
whether a self-interested scientist would share her work in the absence of a normative
expectation.
A scientist’s achievements create for her a stock of credit. This credit is the means
by which she advances her career, which determines both her income and her status
in the profession. Insofar as a scientist is someone who is interested in building a
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career in science, it is then in her interest to maximize credit.3
This is not to deny that a scientist may have other interests, either as a scientist
(e.g., to advance human knowledge) or apart from being a scientist (e.g., to have
time for other pursuits). But these are idiosyncratic, while credit maximization is an
interest that all scientists share. This makes it a particularly powerful tool to explain
scientists’ behavior.
The institutions of science put a premium on originality. Credit is awarded to the
first scientist to publish some particular result or discovery. This feature of science
is known as the priority rule, and the extent to which it shapes scientists’ behavior
is well documented (Merton 1957, 1969, Kitcher 1990, Dasgupta and David 1994,
Strevens 2003).
By rewarding only the first scientist, the priority rule encourages scientists to
work and publish quickly (Dasgupta and David 1994). In this way, it seems that the
priority rule creates an incentive for scientists to share their work. However, “the same
considerations give you a powerful incentive not to share your results before you have
extracted every last publication from them” (Strevens 2017, 3). If results were shared
before publication, this would improve other scientists’ chances of scooping important
discoveries for which those results are relevant. So, Strevens argues, there is a split in
the motivations provided by the priority rule: “The priority rule motivates a scientist
to keep all data, all technology of experimentation, all incipient hypothesizing secret
before discovery, and then to publish, that is to share widely, anything and everything
of social value as soon as possible after discovery (should a discovery actually be
made). The interests of society and the scientist are therefore in complete alignment
after discovery, but before discovery, they appear to be diametrically opposed” (3–4).
Thus, at the crucial stage at which scientific progress can be sped up by sharing, the
priority rule provides no incentive to do so, according to Strevens.
Strevens then goes on to show that a social contract, in which all scientists agree
to widely share their work (even before discovery), would be beneficial to all scientists.
Putting this all together, Strevens has effectively claimed that the problem of sharing
has the structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma: every scientist would be better off if
every scientist shared, but each individual scientist has an incentive not to share.4
3This claim has been defended by various philosophers and sociologists of science, including
Merton (1957, 1969), Latour and Woolgar (1986, chap. 5), Hull (1988, chap. 8), Kitcher (1990), and
Strevens (2003).
4Strevens is not the only one to make this claim. For example, Dasgupta and David (1994, 500)
maintain that “[the priority rule] sets up an immediate tension between cooperative compliance with
the norm of full disclosure (to assist oneself and colleagues in the communal search for knowledge),
and the individualistic competitive urge to win priority races.” See also Arzberger et al. (2004, 146),
Resnik (2006, 135), Borgman (2012, 1072), and Soranno et al. (2015, 70).
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The communist norm is thus a social norm on Strevens’s view: without normative
expectations to transform the game (into something that looks more like a Stag
Hunt), widely sharing scientific work is not an equilibrium.
3 Communism and Intermediate Results
In this article I argue that, given the priority rule, it is often in a scientist’s own
interest to share her work widely. In other words, in many realistic situations sharing
widely is an equilibrium of the relevant game even in the absence of normative
expectations. The problem of sharing is thus not like a Prisoner’s Dilemma: the
role of the communist norm is not to change scientists’ preferences to make sharing
attractive (at least not primarily).
An important part of my argument is the insight that major discoveries can
often be split into multiple smaller discoveries. Boyer (2014, 18 and 21) gives some
examples: the construction of the first laser can be split into a theoretical development
and the actual construction based on that theory, and the experimental test of the
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen thought experiment by Aspect et al. (1982) was preceded
by a number of papers defining and refining the experiment.
In these cases each of the smaller discoveries was published as soon as it was
done, rather than after the major discovery was completed. It is not obvious that the
scientists involved were acting in their own best interest. While credit can be claimed
when a smaller discovery is published, the advantage that the smaller discovery gives
on the way toward the major discovery is thereby lost. In fact, Schawlow and Townes
seem to have lost the race to build the first working laser at least partially because
their publication of the theoretical idea spurred on other teams.
Boyer (2014) provides a model to analyze this tradeoff. In his model the benefits of
sharing intermediate results outweigh the costs, with costs and benefits both measured
in credit assigned via the priority rule. Although Boyer does not specifically discuss
the communist norm, his result could be used to argue that normative expectations
are not necessary to explain it: the priority rule encourages wide sharing of scientific
work even before the potential of future discoveries based on this work has been
exhausted.
One may worry that Boyer’s result is not general enough to support claims
about the origins or persistence of the communist norm. By his own admission,
he only shows that “there exist simple and plausible research situations for which
the [credit] incentive to publish intermediate steps is sufficient” (Boyer 2014, 29). I
aim to show that in fact many if not most research situations are such that there
is a credit incentive to publish intermediate results. This requires a more general
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model, which I call the Intermediate Results Game. I relax Boyer’s assumptions that
there are only two scientists, that the scientists are equally productive, that different
intermediate results are equally hard to achieve, and that scientists share either all or
no intermediate results.
The key claim is that, contra Strevens (2017), a social contract may not be
needed to enforce sharing. The reason for this is the possibility to claim credit for
intermediate results.
4 The Intermediate Results Game
The Intermediate Results Game is intended to investigate scientists’ incentives when
they are working on a project that can be divided into a number of intermediate
stages.5 An intermediate stage is a part of the project which, when completed
successfully, yields a publishable intermediate result in the sense of Boyer (2014,
sec. 2). I assume that stages can only be completed in one order.6 The number of
intermediate stages of the project is denoted k.
A number of scientists n ≥ 2 compete to complete this research project.7 Note
that “scientist” may refer to someone working in the natural sciences, the social
sciences, the humanities, or any other field where the priority rule applies. Moreover,
teams of collaborating scientists are represented by one scientist in the model.
Whenever a scientist completes an intermediate stage, she has to make a choice:
she can either publish the result, or keep it to herself. Publishing benefits the scientist,
because she thereby claims credit for completing that intermediate stage as well as any
preceding stages that remain unpublished, in accordance with the priority rule. The
amount of credit is given by the parameter cj > 0 for each stage j, with C =
∑k
j=1 cj
denoting the total credit available. Publishing also benefits the scientific community:
other scientists no longer need to work independently on the stages that have been
published. Publishing thus “expedites the flow of knowledge”. I use E to denote this
strategy.
If the scientist keeps her result secret instead, she can start working on the
5Although it was developed independently, the game turns out to be essentially identical to the
one studied by Banerjee et al. (2014). In sec. 5 I discuss their main theorem, which is roughly
speaking a weaker result in a more general model (see Heesen 2017, secs. 4 and 5 for more discussion).
However, Banerjee et al. do not give a detailed defense of their assumptions, nor do they apply their
theorems to explaining the communist norm.
6This assumption can be relaxed. See Heesen (2017, sec. 5).
7Cf. Merton (1961), who observed that different scientists frequently work on the same research
problem, often unbeknownst to each other.
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next stage before anyone else can. This improves her chance of being the first to
successfully complete the next stage, thus allowing her to claim credit for more stages
later. Holding onto a discovery until a more expedient time might thus be beneficial
to the scientist. Call this strategy H. When a scientist completes the last stage she
always publishes, claiming credit for all unpublished stages.
An interesting feature of the priority rule is its uncompromising nature: there are
no second prizes, even if the time interval between two discoveries is very small. This
feature was noted by Merton (1957, 658), who quotes the French scientist François
Arago as saying: “‘about the same time’ proves nothing; questions as to priority may
depend on weeks, on days, on hours, on minutes.”
To incorporate this feature into the Intermediate Results Game, it needs to be able
to distinguish arbitrarily small time intervals. This suggests that a continuous-time
probability distribution is needed to model the waiting time (the time it takes a given
scientist to complete an intermediate stage): using discrete time units might place
two discoveries in the same time unit even though in reality one of them happened
(slightly) earlier than the other. For this purpose I use the exponential distribution.
The assumption that waiting times are exponential is equivalent to the assumption
that scientists’ productivity is a (nonstationary) Poisson process. Empirical work
has shown that scientists’ productivity fits a Poisson distribution quite well. Huber
(1998a,b) has established this for the rate at which patents are produced by inventors,
Huber and Wagner-Döbler (2001a) for publications in mathematical logic, Huber and
Wagner-Döbler (2001b) for publications in 19th century physics, and Huber (2001)
for publications in modern physics, biology, and psychology.
On this basis, I assume that the time scientist i takes to complete stage j follows
an exponential distribution with parameter λij > 0. That is, the probability that
it will take scientist i more than t time units to complete stage j is e−tλij .8 The
parameter can be interpreted as the speed at which the scientist works. In particular,
1/λij is the expected time scientist i needs to complete stage j. The speed parameter
may vary by scientist and by stage, allowing for differences in difficulty between stages
8Compare this with Boyer’s assumption that there is a fixed probability λ that a given scientist
will solve a stage in a time unit. As noted above, by using discrete time units this model provides
no way of applying the priority rule when two scientists finish the same stage in the same time unit.
To address this, suppose each time unit is divided into x equal parts, and in each part the scientist
completes the stage with probability λ/x. The probability that the scientist has not completed the
stage at time t (where t is measured in the original time units) is (1− λ/x)tx. A continuous-time
model is obtained by taking the limit as x goes to infinity. Then the probability that the scientist
has not completed the stage at time t is limx→∞(1 − λ/x)tx = e−tλ. So, in addition to being
independently empirically justified, exponential waiting times naturally arise as the limiting case of
Boyer’s model with continuous time.
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and differences in talent, skill, resources, or specialization between scientists.
The exponential distribution has some formal features that I will make use of
(Norris 1998, sec. 2.3). First, it is “memoryless”. This means that after a certain
amount of time has passed and the waiting time has not ended yet, the distribution
of the remaining waiting time is just the original exponential distribution. Second, if
scientist i is working on stage ji then the waiting time until any one of the scientists
finishes the stage she is working on is exponentially distributed with parameter
σj1j2···jn =
n∑
i=1
λiji .
In the special case where all scientists are working on the same stage j I write
σj =
∑n
i=1 λij . Third, the probability that scientist i is the first one to finish the stage
she is working on is λiji/σj1j2···jn .
In general, whether there is an incentive to share in this game depends on the
amount of credit given for each stage and the speed with which the scientists can
solve them. The results presented in the next section show that sharing is incentivized
whenever the following assumption is satisfied.
Assumption 1 (Proportional Credit). The speed parameters and the credit rewards
stand in the following relation: for every scientist i and for each pair of stages j < j′,
cjλij ≥ cj′λij′ .
This assumption states that the credit given for each stage is either proportional
to its difficulty, or earlier stages are awarded more credit than later ones relative to
their difficulty.
Is Proportional Credit likely to hold in practice? It may seem reasonable to
reward scientists proportional to the difficulty of their contributions. But in practice,
rewards for scientific contributions tend to be based on their social value (Merton
1957, Strevens 2003), which may not always correlate with difficulty. Additionally, it
may happen that the scientist who finishes the last stage (“puts it all together”) gets
a relatively large share of the credit.
From a descriptive perspective, these might be the kinds of cases where scientists
do not share their intermediate results, and the game suggests why. From a normative
perspective, perhaps the appropriate conclusion is that Proportional Credit should be
enforced. If scientists are rewarded proportionally to difficulty, without extra credit
for completing the last stage of a research project, then sharing is incentivized.
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5 The Incentive to Share in the Intermediate Re-
sults Game
The Intermediate Results Game consists of a sequence of (probabilistic) events, in
which the scientists can intervene at specific points through their choice of strategy
by publishing their work (E) or keeping it secret (H). In its simplest instantiation
there are two scientists (n = 2) and the research project has two stages (k = 2). The
extensive form of the game is given in figure 1.
N
1
N
(C, 0)
λ12/σ2
(c1, c2)
λ22/σ2
E
N
(C, 0)
λ12/σ21
2
N
(c2, c1)
λ12/σ2
(0, C)
λ22/σ2
E
N
(C, 0)
λ12/σ2
(0, C)
λ22/σ2
H
λ21/σ21
H
λ11/σ1
2
N
(c2, c1)
λ12/σ2
(0, C)
λ22/σ2
E
N
1
N
(C, 0)
λ12/σ2
(c1, c2)
λ22/σ2
E
N
(C, 0)
λ12/σ2
(0, C)
λ22/σ2
H
λ11/σ12
(0, C)
λ22/σ12
H
λ21/σ1
Figure 1: Extensive form of the Intermediate Results Game with perfect information
when n = 2 and k = 2.
At the root node Nature decides which of the two scientists is the first one to
complete the first stage of the project with the indicated probabilities. This leads to
one of two decision nodes marked with a number indicating which scientist makes a
decision at this node.
The scientist can choose one of two strategies (E or H), then Nature decides who
is the next scientist to complete the stage she is working on, and so on until one of
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the scientists completes the second stage. At this point the game ends, with payoff
pairs indicating credit awarded to each scientist (see Heesen 2017, sec. 3 for a more
detailed explanation of fig. 1).
It is implicitly assumed in figure 1 that each scientist knows when another scientist
completes a stage, even when she keeps the result secret. Is it realistic to assume that
scientists have this kind of information? It depends. In small fields where everyone
knows what everyone else is working on word gets around when one of the labs has
solved a particular problem, even when they manage to keep the details to themselves.
Or with pre-registration of clinical trials becoming more common, scientists might
know that a particular trial has finished without knowing its outcome.
N
1
N
(C, 0)
λ12/σ2
(c1, c2)
λ22/σ2
E
N
(C, 0)
λ12/σ21
2
N
(c2, c1)
λ12/σ2
(0, C)
λ22/σ2
E
N
(C, 0)
λ12/σ2
(0, C)
λ22/σ2
H
λ21/σ21
H
λ11/σ1
2
N
(c2, c1)
λ12/σ2
(0, C)
λ22/σ2
E
N
1
N
(C, 0)
λ12/σ2
(c1, c2)
λ22/σ2
E
N
(C, 0)
λ12/σ2
(0, C)
λ22/σ2
H
λ11/σ12
(0, C)
λ22/σ12
H
λ21/σ1
Figure 2: Extensive form of the Intermediate Results Game with imperfect information
when n = 2 and k = 2. Dashed lines indicate information sets.
But in other fields this kind of information might not be available. If this
assumption is dropped scientists are unable to distinguish between certain decision
nodes, indicated by information sets (see fig. 2). This yields a game of imperfect
information. In contrast, the version of the game in which scientists can make these
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distinctions (as in fig. 1) is a game of perfect information. I analyze both versions of
the game.
One way to find an equilibrium in a game of perfect information is by backwards
induction. This involves identifying what a rational scientist will do at a terminal
decision node, and then going backwards through the tree, identifying rational actions
for the scientists by assuming other scientists will play rationally downstream.
In figure 1 it is rational for the scientists at the two lower decision nodes to
play strategy E: this yields either the same payoff or a higher payoff than playing
strategy H. Assuming that the scientists play E at the lower nodes, and assuming
Proportional Credit, it is also rational for the scientists at the two higher nodes to
play strategy E. Thus, under Proportional Credit the backwards induction solution
of this game is for both scientists to play E at both of their decision nodes.
The following theorem shows that this backwards induction analysis also goes
through when there are more than two scientists and/or more than two stages (for
proofs of all theorems, see Heesen 2017). Moreover, any other equilibrium of the
game is behaviorally indistinguishable from the backwards induction solution. That
is, while there may be other equilibria, these differ only in that some scientists make
different decisions at decision nodes that will not actually be reached in the game.
Theorem 1. Consider the Intermediate Results Game with perfect information with
n ≥ 2 scientists and k ≥ 1 stages, and assume Proportional Credit.
(a) The game has a (unique) backwards induction solution in which all scientists
play strategy E at every decision node.
(b) There are no equilibria (in pure or mixed strategies) that are behaviorally distinct
from the backwards induction solution.
An equilibrium analysis thus yields a unique prediction for the game with perfect
information. How about the game with imperfect information? Equilibria can be
identified by analyzing the normal form of the game. Table 1 gives the expected
credit for each scientist in two examples, one in which the first scientist is thrice as
fast as the second, and one in which the second stage can be completed thrice as
quickly as the first stage (cf. Heesen 2017, table 4.1). Note that because the scientists
cannot distinguish between their two decision nodes, only two (pure) strategies are
available to them.
Since the credit given for each stage is equal in both cases, example 1 satisfies
Proportional Credit while example 2 does not. In example 1, the only equilibrium
is the one in which both scientists play strategy E, and this is a strict equilibrium
12
Copyright Philosophy of Science 2017
Preprint (not copyedited or formatted)
Please use DOI when citing or quoting
Table 1: Normal Form of the Intermediate Results Game with Imperfect Information
Example 1 Example 2
E H E H
E (24, 8) (2614 , 5
3
4) (16, 16) (15, 17)
H (2314 , 8
3
4) (27, 5) (17, 15) (16, 16)
Note.—Scientist 1’s strategy as the rows and scientist 2’s strategy as the columns.
Example 1, λ11 = λ12 = 3, λ21 = λ22 = 1, and c1 = c2 = 16. Example 2, λ11 = λ21 = 1,
λ12 = λ22 = 3, and c1 = c2 = 16.
(a scientist who deviates is strictly worse off). In example 2, both scientists play
strategy H in the unique and strict equilibrium.
The features of example 1 generalize for different numbers of scientists and stages.
Theorem 2. Consider the Intermediate Results Game with imperfect information
with n ≥ 2 scientists and k ≥ 1 stages and assume Proportional Credit.
(a) The game has an equilibrium in which all scientists play strategy E at every
information set.
(b) There are no other equilibria (in pure or mixed strategies).
(c) The equilibrium is strict.
Note that theorem 2.a was first proved by Banerjee et al. (2014, theorem 2.1).
In fact they show that the Intermediate Results Game with imperfect information
has an equilibrium in which all scientists share under the following, somewhat more
general condition: for every scientist i and for each pair of stages j < j′,
cj(σj − λij)
cj′(σj′ − λij′) ≥
λij′
σj′
.
Because Banerjee et al. show neither uniqueness9 nor strictness of the equilibrium,
the following interpretation of theorems 1 and 2 (on which I base my explanation of
the communist norm in the next two sections) may not be valid under their more
general condition.
9Banerjee et al. only prove uniqueness in case a significant proportion of the scientists commits
to sharing before the game starts.
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Theorems 1 and 2 say that if not every scientist immediately shares any stage
that she completes, there is at least one scientist who is irrational in the sense that
she would have had a higher expected credit if she had played a different strategy. In
other words, if all scientists are rational expected credit maximizers they must all
share every stage they complete.
6 Explaining the Persistence of the Communist
Norm
I take the results from section 5 to give an explanation of the persistence of the
communist norm, that is, the fact that real scientists publish their intermediate
results in a large range of cases. The explanation runs as follows.
Suppose scientists are generally sharing their intermediate results. If a given
scientist withholds an intermediate result, she thereby lowers her expected credit
(this is just what it means for sharing to be a strict equilibrium). Hence the scientist
has a credit incentive to return to sharing. So credit incentives can correct (small)
deviations from the communist norm.
Note that I do not claim that real scientists are rational credit-maximizers. All
that follows for real scientists is that they have a credit incentive to conform to the
norm (even when they fail to act on it). This fact, combined with the fact that
real scientists are at least somewhat sensitive to credit incentives, constitutes my
explanation of the persistence of the norm.
My explanation relies on three basic principles: scientists’ sensitivity to credit
incentives, intermediate results being given sufficient credit as specified by Proportional
Credit, and the priority rule as the mechanism for assigning credit. These ingredients
are sufficient to explain the persistence of the norm. In particular, there is no need
for a social contract, normative expectations, or altruism.
This leads to a potential objection. On my construal, the communist norm
is not a social norm in Bicchieri’s sense, as normative expectations have no role
in the explanation. But the available evidence seems to refute this: scientists
(normatively) expect other scientists to conform to the communist norm (Louis et al.
2002, Macfarlane and Cheng 2008). This appears to be at odds with an explanation
based on the Intermediate Results Game: since the game is zero-sum, other scientists
actually benefit when a given scientist fails to share, so from a credit-maximizing
perspective they should be encouraging each other to keep secrets.
But the game considers only those scientists who are directly competing on a
given research project. While those scientists may stand to gain if their competitors
14
Copyright Philosophy of Science 2017
Preprint (not copyedited or formatted)
Please use DOI when citing or quoting
fail to share, the wider scientific community stands to lose, as it will take longer to
complete the research project. I claim that this wider community is the source of any
normative expectations regarding sharing behavior. The normative expectations can
then also be explained from self-interest, as the completion of the research project
may benefit other scientists’ research.10
This yields an empirical prediction that can help decide between Strevens’s
explanation and mine. On Strevens’s explanation withholding an intermediate result
is a breach of a social contract which most directly impacts the immediate competitors
of the scientist within the research project, who may legitimately regard it as unfair.
On my explanation withholding actually benefits the immediate competitors; the
most direct negative impact is on those scientists who work on nearby projects.
An examination of which scientists (direct competitors or those working on nearby
projects) tend to object most vocally when other scientists fail to share may thus
help decide whether sharing happens out of self-interested credit-maximization or as
the result of a social contract.
The scope of my explanation is restricted to the sharing of “intermediate results,”
that is, results that are significant enough to be publishable in their own right.
Strevens points out a limitation of this view: “nothing will be shared until something
relevant is ready for publication, and worse, it is only what characteristically goes into
the journals that gets broadcast, so shareables [e.g., details of experimental methods
or raw data] will remain hidden” (Strevens 2017, 5). This constitutes an objection to
my explanation, as according to Strevens the communist norm requires that any and
all results should be shared, regardless of their credit worthiness.
I reply that it is not clear that the communist norm makes such strong requirements.
When the material under consideration is too little or too detailed to be considered
publishable, scientists’ actual compliance with a putative norm of sharing drops off
steeply (Louis et al. 2002, Tenopir et al. 2011). If Strevens’s aim is to explain a norm
of sharing for these cases, he may be trying to explain something that does not exist.
This leaves the question of what to do if one wants to encourage sharing work
below publishable size, especially in the kinds of cases where sharing is currently not
standard practice. Strevens (2017) shows that scientists have a common interest in
establishing a norm of sharing for such cases.
My contribution, in contrast, is in providing a suggestion for how such a norm
could be established. If getting scientists to share these minor results or crucial
10Alternatively, normative expectations may arise simply because everyone in the community is
behaving in a certain way. Bicchieri (2006, 40) points out that “[s]ome conventions may not involve
externalities, at least initially, but they may become so well entrenched that people start attaching
value to them.”
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details is a goal that scientists and policy makers consider important, the game gives
clear directions on how to get there: give credit for smaller publications and for
sharing crucial details (Tenopir et al. 2011, Goring et al. 2014). Modern information
technology readily suggests ways in which this can be done without overburdening
existing scientific journals (Piwowar 2013).
Strevens (2017) is able to show scientists’ common interest in sharing because his
model is not zero-sum. This is because Strevens’s model allows for the possibility
that the research project is never completed by anyone.11 By sharing their progress,
Strevens assumes, the scientists improve each other’s chances of completing the
research project, thus increasing the total expected credit. As long as this “extra”
credit is divided in such a way that everyone benefits at least a little, it is clear that
everyone will be better off if everyone shares.
On this point, Strevens’s model is arguably more realistic: research projects
sometimes fail to reach their goal. It would be interesting to study a model which
incorporates both a positive probability of failure and credit for intermediate results.
Whether there would be an incentive to share intermediate results under conditions
similar to those I have found here is a question I leave for future research.
There are other ways to change the game that would make it no longer zero-sum.
For example, Boyer-Kassem and Imbert (2015, sec. 4) argue that one should consider
credit per unit of time (rather than “total credit” which I use). Then sharing benefits
all scientists to some extent by decreasing the expected completion time of the research
project. For present purposes it makes no difference: my theorems still hold if credit
is measured per unit of time (see Heesen 2017, sec. 7).
7 Explaining the Origins of the Communist Norm
Above I argued that the results from section 5 explain the persistence of the communist
norm. It could be argued that they also explain the origins of the norm: the uniqueness
clauses in theorems 1 and 2 guarantee that behavior in accordance with the communist
norm is the only pattern that rational credit-maximizing scientists could settle on (in
cases in which their assumptions are satisfied).
But such an argument would make stringent demands on the scientists’ rationality
which real scientists are unlikely to satisfy. This section investigates the question
whether less than perfectly rational scientists would also learn to share their inter-
11In contrast, in the Intermediate Results Game the scientists complete all k stages in finite time
with probability one. The models of Banerjee et al. (2014), Boyer (2014), and Boyer-Kassem and
Imbert (2015) have the same feature.
16
Copyright Philosophy of Science 2017
Preprint (not copyedited or formatted)
Please use DOI when citing or quoting
mediate results, thus giving a more robust account of the origins of the communist
norm.
To answer this question I consider a boundedly rational learning rule that makes
only minimal assumptions on the cognitive abilities of the scientists. In particular, it
requires only that the scientists know which strategies are available to them and that
they can compare the credit earned under different strategies.
The rule I consider is probe and adjust. Suppose the game with imperfect in-
formation is played repeatedly. A scientist using probe and adjust follows a simple
procedure: on each round (one instance of the game), play the same strategy as the
round before with probability 1 − ε, or “probe” a new strategy with probability ε
(with 0 < ε < 1; ε is usually “small”). In case of a probe, pick a new strategy
uniformly at random from all possible strategies. After playing this strategy for one
round, the probe is evaluated: if the payoff in the probing round is higher than the
payoff in the previous round, keep the probed strategy; if the payoff is lower, return
to the old strategy; if payoffs are equal, return to the old strategy with probability q
and retain the probe with probability 1− q (with 0 < q < 1).
Consider a population of n ≥ 2 scientists using probe and adjust to determine
their strategy in the Intermediate Results Game with imperfect information. Assume
the number of stages k ≥ 1 is fixed and Proportional Credit is satisfied. Assume
all scientists use the same values of ε and q (this assumption can be relaxed, see
Huttegger et al. 2014, 837–838). Then the following result can be proven.
Theorem 3. For any probability p < 1, if the probe probability ε > 0 is small enough
there exists a T such that on an arbitrary round t with t > T , all scientists play
strategy E at every information set with probability at least p.
If, on a given round, all scientists play strategy E at every information set, they
may be said to have learned to share their intermediate results. The theorem says
that the probability of this happening can be made arbitrarily high by choosing a
small enough probe probability. Moreover, the theorem says that once the scientists
learn to share their intermediate results they continue to do so on most subsequent
rounds. So even on this cognitively simple learning rule both the origins and the
persistence of the communist norm can be explained on the basis of credit incentives
if Proportional Credit holds.12
How historically plausible is my claim that credit incentives are responsible for
the origins of the communist norm? It is not entirely clear how one should evaluate
12Because the equilibrium in the game with imperfect information is both strict and unique,
various other learning rules and evolutionary dynamics can be shown to converge to it. Examples
include fictitious play, the best-response dynamics, and the replicator dynamics.
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this question. But a necessary condition for my explanation to be correct is that
credit for scientific work, and in particular credit awarded in accordance with the
priority rule, predates the communist norm.
As Merton (1957) points out, scientists’ concern for priority goes back at least as
far as Galileo. In 1610, he used an anagram to report seeing Saturn as a “triple star”
(the first sighting of the rings of Saturn). The device of the anagram served “the
double purpose of establishing priority of conception and of yet not putting rivals on
to one’s original ideas, until they had been further worked out” (Merton 1957, 654).
The communist norm, on the other hand, was not established as a norm of
science until around 1665. At the time, “many men of science still set a premium
upon secrecy” (Zuckerman and Merton 1971, 69). The first scientific journals—the
Journal des Sçavans and the Philosophical Transactions, both founded in 1665—were
instrumental “for the emergence of that component of the ethos of science which has
been described as ‘communism’: the norm which prescribes the open communication
of findings to other scientists” (69).
8 Conclusion
In the introduction I argued that the sharing of scientific results (mandated by the
communist norm) is important to the success of science and indeed to the existence
of science as we know it. My theorems show that the priority rule gives scientists an
incentive to share intermediate results whenever these are awarded credit proportional
to their difficulty. This can be used to explain both the origins and the persistence of
the communist norm, answering the questions I raised in the introduction.
If my explanation is accepted, the crucial features of the social structure of science
that maintain the communist norm are the fact that scientists respond to credit
incentives, the priority rule, and intermediate results being awarded sufficient credit.
Tinkering with these features thus risks undercutting one of the most central aspects
of science as a social enterprise.
By emphasizing credit incentives moderated by the priority rule, this paper falls
in the tradition of Kitcher (1990), Dasgupta and David (1994), and Strevens (2003).
Like those papers, I have picked one aspect of the social structure of science, and
shown how the priority rule has the power to shape that aspect to science’s benefit.
I take my results to show that no special explanation (using, e.g., normative
expectations or a social contract) is required for the communist norm, contra Strevens
(2017). However, this only applies to whatever is sufficiently rewarded with credit.
Sharing scientific work that is too insignificant to be published is not incentivized
in the same way. But insofar as this is a problem it suggests its own solution: give
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sufficient credit for whatever one would like to see shared, and scientists will indeed
start sharing it.
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